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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Colton Merrill entered an agreement with the State whereby the State promised to concur
with the PSI’s recommendation for retained jurisdiction.

At sentencing, the prosecutor

eventually recommended retained jurisdiction, but he also made statements that were
fundamentally at odds with that recommendation, such as “I think a straight prison
recommendation is just fantastic.” (Tr., p.32, Ls.2-10) (emphasis added).
The district court declined to follow the PSI’s recommendation and sentenced Mr. Merrill
to straight prison. On appeal, Mr. Merrill contends that the prosecutor’s additional, incompatible
statements breached the plea agreement, and he asks for a new sentencing hearing before a
different judge.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address several of the State’s attempts at justifying and
excusing the prosecutor’s comments, and to demonstrate the correct application of the Perry1
fundamental error standard to case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Merrill’s Appellant’s Brief, pp.1-4, and are incorporated herein by reference.

1

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010).
1

ISSUE
Did the State breach the plea agreement by making statements that were fundamentally at odds
with the sentencing dispositions that it was obligated to recommend?
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ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Breached The Plea Agreement By Making Statements That Were Fundamentally
At Odds With The Sentencing Dispositions The State Was Obligated To Recommend, Affecting
Mr. Merrill’s Substantial Rights
A.

Introduction
As argued in the Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-9, the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by

making statements at sentencing that were fundamentally at odds with the State’s obligation to
concur in the PSI’s recommendation for retained jurisdiction.

Although the prosecutor

ultimately made the requisite recommendation, he did so only after mocking that
recommendation and the PSI writer for making it; after minimizing the reasons that support the
recommendation and highlighting the reasons against it; after bringing in the fact that
Mr. Merrill’s mother’s had been given a second chance at retained jurisdiction and failed and
then telling the court Mr. Merrill “was on the same path”; and after expressing his clear personal
preference for a “straight prison” sentence.
Contrary to the State’s arguments, the prosecutor’s statements clearly breached the plea
agreement and affected Mr. Merrill’s substantial rights, entitling Mr. Merrill to a new sentencing
hearing.
B.

The Prosecutor Made Statements That Clearly Violated The Plea Agreement
The prosecutor made multiple statements that, read together or in isolation, were

fundamentally at odds with the disposition the State was obliged to make, in violation of the plea
agreement.

3

1.

The Prosecutor’s Remarks Mocking The PSI’s Recommendation, And
The PSI Writer For Making It, Cannot Be Justified As “Expressions Of
Surprise”

Contrary to the State’s arguments (Respondent’s Brief, p.8), the prosecutor’s preliminary
statement mocking the PSI writer for recommending retained jurisdiction cannot be justified as a
mere “expression of surprise.” The prosecutor’s comment, “I don’t know if I have too much
extra stuff in my eggnog or the presentence investigator writer does” (Tr., p.29, L.17 – p.30,
L.10), questioned the lucidity and credibility of the PSI writer, and expressed skepticism and
distrust for the recommendation he made. The comment made it clear to the court that the
prosecutor did not take the PSI’s recommendation seriously, and in so doing, undermined the
value of the recommendation Mr. Merrill had bargained for, in violation of the plea agreement.
2.

The Prosecutor’s Comments Cannot Be Justified As A Buttress Against
Mr. Merrill’s Request For Probation

Contrary to the State’s argument (Respondent’s Brief, p.9), the prosecutor did not have
unlimited freedom to argue that Mr. Merrill was unamenable to probation. While the prosecutor
could permissibly argue against Mr. Merrill’s request for immediate reinstatement on probation,
see State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 168 (Ct. App. 2009) (prosecutor’s adverse statements
were permissible to buttress against defendant’s request for greater leniency), the prosecutor was
prohibited by the plea agreement from making statements that were incompatible with the
opportunity for probation following a period of retained jurisdiction. Yet, the prosecutor’s
arguments against probation were unqualified and unconditional, and thus incompatible with the
State’s recommendation.
Additionally, there was no permissible reason for the prosecutor to specify that
Mr. Merrill’s mother “got another chance at retained jurisdiction,” is now on her “third rider,”
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and that Mr. Merrill is “on the same path.”

(Tr., p.31, Ls.14-18.)

Rather, as argued in

Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7, the only practical purpose for drawing a comparison that included
these details was to express the prosecutor’s personal opinion and belief that Mr. Merrill, like his
mother, will fail if given another chance at retained jurisdiction.

Such comments were

fundamentally at odds with a recommendation for retaining jurisdiction, and violated the plea
agreement.
Contrary to the State’s argument (Respondent’s Brief, p.10), the comments were not
offered to show lack of a support network on probation; rather, as the prosecutor expressly told
that court, Mr. Merrill’s family was a key reason behind his personal preference for “straight
prison”:
I’ve had a Merrill on my calendar for four years at least once a month.
So that’s how irritated I am by this, and that’s why I think a straight prison
recommendation is just fantastic.
(Tr., p.32, Ls.5-10) (emphasis added).
3.

Expressing A Preference For A “Straight Prison Recommendation” Is Not
Reconcilable With A Recommendation For Retained Jurisdiction

Contrary to the State’s argument (Respondent’s Brief, p.11), the prosecutor did not
express a preference for “a prison recommendation”; he expressed a preference for “a straight
prison recommendation” – which means prison without retained jurisdiction. And, contrary to
the State’s argument, expressing a preference for “straight prison” cannot be reconciled with the
prosecutor’s obligation to recommend retained jurisdiction. Additionally, that his preferred
recommendation for “straight prison” was an alternative to the one the State had promised, is
plain from the comments that followed, which began with “But.” In context:
So that’s how irritated I am by this, and that’s why I think a straight prison
recommendation is just fantastic.
5

But, giving him the benefit of the doubt. …
(Tr., p.32, Ls.5-10) (emphasis added).
Whether read in isolation or in the context of his overall sentencing argument, the
prosecutor’s expression of a personal preference for “straight prison” is incompatible with the
recommendation the State was obligated to make. This statement, and the other statements
identified in Appellant’s Brief, demonstrate a clear breach of the plea agreement.
C.

The Failure To Object Was Not A Tactical Decision
To the extent the State suggests that Mr. Merrill has not demonstrated the failure to object

was not a tactical decision, Mr. Merrill respectfully refers this Court to his argument in
Appellant’s Brief, pp.16-17.
D.

The Breach Affected Mr. Merrill’s Substantial Rights
Mr. Merrill’s claim satisfies the third prong of the Perry fundamental error test: he has

demonstrated that there is a reasonable possibility that the district court would have followed the
PSI’s recommendation to impose a sentence with retained jurisdiction, instead of straight prison,
had the prosecutor not breached the plea agreement. The State’s arguments to the contrary
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.11-12), are flawed.
First, the State incorrectly relies on the federal harmless error standard used in Puckett to
argue that the State’s breach, in this case, is “harmless because Mr. Merrill likely would not have
received a period of retained jurisdiction in any event.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.12) (citing
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 141-142 (2009)) (emphasis added.)2 The federal plain

2

In Puckett the United States Supreme Court decided that an unpreserved claim that the
government breached a plea agreement was subject to plain-error review as set forth in Rule
52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the standard of review established in
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 556 U.S. at 141.
6

error standard is different from the Idaho Perry fundamental error standard. Under the federal
standard, for a defendant to demonstrate his substantial rights were affected, “there must be a
reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the sentencing.” United States v.
Whitney, 673 F.3d 965, 972 (2012) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Under the
federal standard, a defendant must show a “likelihood” of a different outcome but-for the
government’s breach. Id.
Idaho’s Perry standard requires a lesser burden; a defendant bears the burden to show
there is a “reasonable possibility” the error affected the sentencing outcome. 150 Idaho at 236
(emphasis added). Under the Perry standard, a defendant is not required to demonstrate that a
different outcome was “probable” or “likely,” only that it was “reasonably possible.” Id. Thus,
Mr. Merrill is not required to demonstrate that the district court would “likely,” or “probably,”
have followed the PSI’s recommendation for retained jurisdiction. Rather, under the correct
legal standard, Mr. Merrill is required to show that receiving a sentence with retained jurisdiction
was reasonably possible. As argued in his Appellant’s Brief pp.19-19, Mr. Merrill has met that
burden.
Second, the State’s arguments seek to downplay the importance of its recommendation
on the district court’s sentencing decision. (Respondent’s Brief, p.12.) However, our courts
have long recognized the importance of the government’s recommendation on the sentence
imposed. See, e.g. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (vacating defendant’s sentence
because the prosecutor breached a promise to refrain from recommending a specific term of
imprisonment). Additionally, as argued in Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-19, presenting the court a
“united front” with all three recommenders – the PSI writer, Mr. Merrill, and the State –
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concurring in the recommendation, as Mr. Merrill had bargained for, was especially valuable in
this case.
Third, contrary to the State’s argument (Respondent’s Brief, p.12), the district court’s
question to defense counsel, “why should I even entertain a request for retained jurisdiction
rather than simply imposing the sentence … ?” does not demonstrate that the prosecutor’s breach
was harmless. To the contrary, the question reveals that the court had questions about the PSI’s
recommendation for retained jurisdiction, underscoring the importance of an unequivocal
concurrence by the State in that recommendation. However, the prosecutor’s hostile, derogatory
comments regarding that recommendation answered the court’s question in a manner that clearly
violated the State’s agreement.
Finally, and contrary to the State’s argument (Respondent’s Brief, p.12), the district
court’s explanation of its sentence does not demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments had no
impact on it. On the contrary, the court’s sentencing decision appears to follow prosecutor’s
improper commentary3 lockstep. (See Tr., p.40, L.24 – p.41, L.8.) Given the sentencing court’s
multi-faceted decision-making process, and the extent and tone of the prosecutor’s improper
comments in this case, “one really cannot calculate how the [prosecutor’s breach] may have
affected the perceptions of the sentencing judge.” Whitney, 673 F.3d at 973.

3

As argued in Appellant’s brief, at page 11, the prosecutor also told the court he had personal,
conflicting feelings about the PSI’s recommendation and decided to read aloud, from the
presentence investigation, a list of reasons supporting a prison sentence for Mr. Merrill: his
extensive criminal history, that the instant offense is his third felony; that he had completed a
rider and had a chance to participate in specialty court; that he’d been given previous chances at
probation and treatment; the serious nature of the instant offense; and a conclusion that these
reasons “could merit a recommendation of incarceration with the IDOC.” (citing Tr., p.30,
Ls.11-20.)
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As argued in the Appellant’s Brief, pp.17-18, retained jurisdiction not only was a viable
disposition, it was the disposition recommended by the PSI investigator, who was the expert in
such matters and the advisor to the court, and who was aligned with neither party. Thus, retained
jurisdiction was a reasonable disposition for this case. It is reasonably possible that the court
would have followed the PSI’s recommendation, instead of rejecting it, had the prosecutor
concurred in that recommendation, presenting the court with a “united front,” instead of arguing
against it.
Mr. Merrill was entitled to the State’s unequivocal concurrence in the PSI’s
recommendation for retained jurisdiction. By making statements that were fundamentally at
odds with the PSI’s recommendation, the prosecutor deprived Mr. Merrill of the benefit of his
bargain, in violation of the plea agreement. The PSI’s recommendation for retained jurisdiction
was a reasonable disposition for this case, and there is a reasonable possibility the district court
would have followed that recommendation, had the prosecutor not argued against it. Mr. Merrill
is entitled to a new sentencing hearing, before a different judge. See McAmis v. State, 155 Idaho
796, 798 (Ct. App. 2013).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Merrill
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the orders revoking probation and executing
sentence in his 2013 and 2015 cases, vacate his sentence in the 2016 case, and remand his cases
to the district court for resentencing before a different judge.
DATED this 13th day of November, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
9

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of November, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
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COLTON MERRILL
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E-MAILED BRIEF
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
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EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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